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The present paper was inspired by and is a response to the Rola-Rubzen,
Hardaker and Dillon paper ‘Agricultural economists and world poverty: pro-




 2001). It is agreed that the position
of agricultural economists in foreign aid and poverty programs has declined
over recent decades. Such a feeling of guilt and remorse expressed by the
above authors does indeed create considerable ‘angst’. A major reason for this
state of affairs lies in ‘the ﬂavour of the month’ approach of the development
agencies. These include women in development, gender-based farming systems
research, household nutrition and food security, people participation, and targeting
the poorest of the poor. These fads have driven disciplinary considerations to the
wall and the more widely-deﬁned objectives have reduced the drive for economic
efﬁciency. We argue there is still a place for better designed and delivered assistance
programs within the wider framework of assistance that has become fashionable.
Greater application of institutional principles in both the political processes asso-
ciated with assistance and the implementation agencies would improve the out-
comes of many projects. Particular attention would need to be given to the
interface between the development agencies and recipient governments. The
present paper picks up on the market failure aspects of agriculture’s rather poor
contribution to development, and develops a wider perspective in terms of the new






Agricultural economists and world poverty: progress and prospects
 
’,
asks ‘why have agricultural economists been sidelined in development work?’,
and suggests that one reason is the move in economics generally towards
‘rational’ or ‘neo-liberal’ economics. ‘Because our profession seems to have
been doing less microeconomic work, it has become more difﬁcult to distin-
guish us from general economists who have increasingly been getting a bad
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press .… It seems clear to us that the main reason why economists, including
agricultural economists, are being increasingly marginalised in important
policy debates is the widespread perception that the pro-market stance
of most economists is people- and environment-unfriendly’. The authors go
on to suggest ‘that it is this disaffection with economics and economists





 2001, pp. 59–60). These observations raise
serious issues for the profession. The argument that a ‘disaffection with
economists has led to a burgeoning of fads and fancies’ is not the only rea-
son for the development issues raised. It is plausible to ask whether there is
a general failure of development policies and economists are being made
the scapegoat?
The above observations may overstate the case, but they do reﬂect some
trends that are bad for the employment of the agricultural economics pro-
fession. We argue that the contribution of economists is as valid as ever.
There is a continuing need for objective positive analysis that sees things as
they really are.
The present authors are agricultural economists formerly involved in advising
or administering development assistance programs and projects. We see our res-
ponse as a continuation of the debate about the role of agricultural econo-
mists in development. We set out below our views on the decline of agricultural
economics as a discipline and a suggested fresh view of the aid and develop-
ment process based on the new institutional economics (NIE). Most aid is
delivered through services provided by government departments. There is
considerable scope for improvement in the effectiveness and efﬁciency of
such services, involving choice of alternative institutions, processes and
rules that together deliver the beneﬁts of a policy to a target group or to all
of society. We offer a commentary on some of the reforms that have taken
place in this area.
 
2. Choice of issues
 
Development agencies have been and still are guilty of the charge of indulg-
ing in a ‘ﬂavour of the month’ approach to development assistance to the
extent that issues and topics – women in development; gender-based farm-
ing systems research; household nutrition and food security; sustainable
this, that or the other; good governance; people’s participation in rural
development; stakeholder ownership of projects and programs; assisting
the poorest of the poor; and privatization of services – have long since
driven disciplinary considerations to the wall. There are many reasons for
this behaviour, among which are: the need to keep the attention and 
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  the repeated failure of development assistance to
deliver quickly (or even at all) on its promises; fundamental changes in
higher education in developed countries that have led to the reduction of
rigorous disciplinary training in favour of consumer-driven courses within




 major shifts in thinking about the
proper role of government and the civil service in a modern democracy; and
the huge increase in the number and size of non-government organisations
(NGO), several of which have become involved in long-term development
assistance rather than short-term relief and rehabilitation, necessitating
their adoption of a ‘project cycle’ approach with all the planning, evaluation
and bureaucracy that implies.
As a result of these changes (or because of them), there has been a move-
ment away from a hard disciplinary approach to development analysis and
delivery toward softer options, suggested by disciplines such as develop-
ment anthropology and backed by various NGO. There is much less
emphasis on smallholders as productive units and the identiﬁcation of
‘masterfarmers’, who could offer leadership roles and set an example of
what could be achieved (the early insights of T.W. Schultz (1964) have been
forgotten). This has led to village improvement schemes where better social








G.E. Rossmiller can add from his own experience the gyrations in program emphasis by
the USA Agency for International Development (USAID). The USAID has never been
made a permanent ﬁxture of the USA Government and thus relies on periodic renewals of
its mandate by the USA Congress. This makes it super responsive to Congressional whims
as it is always in the process of preparing justiﬁcation testimony to Congress for its
renewal. Having gone through a period, with the emphasis on agricultural sector develop-
ment led primarily by the central government of the recipient country, Congress, in the
early 1970s, became enamoured with the concept (or at least the slogan) of ‘the poorest of
the poor’. It decreed that all future agricultural development projects would be justiﬁed on
the basis of helping the poorest of the poor. Responding with over-enthusiastic zeal,
USAID interpreted Congressional intent to mean that projects were to seek out the most
remote rural areas of the country, and to then ﬁnd the poorest natives among the inhabit-
ants and to then hold their hands. Without links to the central government policy process
many such projects were vulnerable to being wiped out (inadvertently or on purpose) by the
stroke of a policy maker’s pen. Nevertheless, funding for agricultural sector development
projects ran out without renewal and for several years the poorest of the poor were empha-




A cursory glance at modern curricula shows that as with the donors, so with the





This raises the issue of urban migration which, in African societies at least, is more
likely to be regarded as a ‘harm’ than a ‘good’. Some policy measures are obviously related
to stemming this ﬂow rather than encouraging it. 
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linear model of development stemming from increased agricultural produc-
tivity (alone) has apparently been rejected. This suggests to us that agricul-
tural productivity by itself is just not enough to generate growth processes
that satisfy decision makers and aid donors at the local level in many cases.
However, it should not be forgotten that there have been some ‘good’





Clearly, this thematic approach has had serious consequences for some
scientists and social scientists involved in development work, teaching, research
and consultancy, as well as inside the agencies. For agricultural economists,
it has coincided with a considerable decline in the demand for their services
which, in our experience, may be permanent. To a large extent, this is only
to be expected: after all, the size and hence the economic importance of the
agricultural sector declines relatively and eventually absolutely with economic
development. Then too, the quantity and form of government support to
agriculture has changed with a consequent decline in the need for the sort of
analysis that has kept so many agricultural economists occupied for so long.
The gulf between agricultural economists who are actually involved in the
policy process and those who are based in academic institutions has widened
and deepened over the years. Experience has shown that the development
process is difﬁcult to launch in many societies. This challenges the statement
that ‘[a]gricultural economists seem to have largely convinced each other
that we know what to do to get agriculture moving and poverty reduced’.
Senior agricultural economists in government advisory roles and consult-
ant agricultural development economists have real concerns about whether the
profession has answers to the very real problems of agricultural develop-
ment, the rural economy and world poverty! A perusal of the development
journals supports this. In view of this, there is also a need to take a careful
and critical look at the tool kit of a trained agricultural economist. Have
the syllabi in our universities responded to present day needs in terms of
sociology, anthropology and economics? What should it contain if agricul-
tural economics is to be able to make a useful contribution to the develop-
ment debate, let alone in terms of practical development assistance? It is
questions such as these that need to be addressed, and in a spirit of humil-
ity we suggest that agricultural economists have no ‘right’ to be consulted;
they need to earn the privilege, recognising that economic criteria, whilst
important, are very far from being the sole or even necessarily the domin-
ant determinant in any sectoral policy choice.
 
3. What economics has to offer
 
Present day agricultural economics evolved out of a merger of farm man-
agement on the one hand and general economics on the other. The farm 
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management branch of the profession has itself evolved from farm manage-
ment budgeting into farming systems analysis, presently with an emphasis on
gender-based studies and/or environmental sustainability. Part of the strength
of farm management economists has been their close working relationships
with agronomists and other agricultural scientists, including social scientists,
resulting in a keen understanding of the physical, technical, biological and
social processes with which they must deal in doing their farm management
work. Carruthers and Kydd (1997) make the point in the following way:
As new development concerns came in, agricultural economists had to
develop expertise in identifying and understanding decision-making
of poorer farmers, women farmers, and environmentally threatened
farmers. This was useful because agricultural economists bring to the
analysis (a) a detailed knowledge of production systems and their
interaction with household resources and objectives (b) a strong
empirical research tradition based on getting as much statistically
valid inference as possible out of a difﬁcult subject for survey and (c)
its testing, using statistical and operations research techniques. The
agricultural economist’s approach is in strong contrast to the main
methods of a new breed of development anthropologists and some
sociologists – who tend to be more prepared to make assertions about
rural circumstances/problems which are difﬁcult to validate within any
clear epistemology.
The agricultural economics profession has broadened extensively from its
farm management beginnings to the point where a relatively small propor-
tion of agricultural economists work in the farm management arena. But
when doing problem solving work, whether as consultants, civil servants or
professors, agricultural economists of necessity carry on the tradition of





. (2001) argue that agricultural economists have been
sidelined because they are doing less microeconomic work and are thus
indistinguishable from general economists (who are getting, and perhaps
deserving, increasingly bad press). If by microeconomics they mean analy-
sis of the ﬁrm (farm), many of us in the profession have never worked at
that level anyway. A large number of agricultural economists have spent
their careers working in the agricultural policy arena, others in agricultural
trade including policy, in sector analysis, in marketing and a host of other
work on problems and issues beyond the farm gate. If, however, they mean
by  microeconomics all things that economists do, except the analysis of
broad national and international economic aggregates (national income,
consumption, saving, government spending, taxes, transfers, balance of
payments), i.e. the ﬁeld of analysis commonly known as macroeconomics, 
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they are totally misjudging what agricultural economists do. Agricultural
economists, especially those dealing with policy of any description, must
understand enough about macroeconomics to recognize the effects of the
macroeconomy on the real sectors such as agriculture (as well as the effects
of the real sectors on the macroeconomy), but they do not do macroeco-
nomics per se. Thus they are hardly in a position to be maligned along
with the macroeconomists, who for the most part were the authors of the
stabilisation and liberalisation policy response to the macroeconomic crises
in many countries during the 1980s and 1990s.




. (2001) are over reacting to the earlier
harsh and unbending market-orientated solutions imposed as conditional-
ities by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund when they argue
for agricultural economists to pay more attention to market failure and
missing markets rather than always opting for the market solution. We
agree, but with caution. To stray too far from market orientation is to fall
into the same trap as the non-economist, do-gooders that the authors criti-
cise earlier. As the authors say, we need to acknowledge the concerns and
viewpoints of other disciplines. But we do not have to accept their solu-
tions. It is indeed a professional failure if we cannot communicate the
importance of market orientation without being free-market bigots.
The rigor of the economics discipline still has an important role to play.
The stark reality of economic analysis often shows that there is no such
thing as a free lunch. Often there is not a Pareto better solution, and even
if there is, the compensation principle is seldom invoked. With any change
from the status quo there are losers as well as winners and policy is all
about changing the status quo! Widespread disaffection with economics
and economists might have exacerbated the burgeoning of fads and fancies
in (not only) development economics. But disaffection itself has been
brought about by the misconceptions and often total lack of understanding
of economic principles by people allowed into the development process by
a mistaken egalitarian notion that all stakeholders and any NGO, no matter
its self-interest and agenda, should be heard equally.
The very people that decry the sad state of agricultural development
affairs are the ones that have imposed limits and conditions on the margin
of manoeuvre of all development professionals, not least being agricultural
economists. The World Bank and many national donors have demanded
that NGO, any NGO, be granted equal partnerships in the development
game. Moreover, all stakeholders must be given equal voice in the process.
Then when the NGO and the stakeholders insist on too many non-technical
criteria to be used in selecting and managing projects, the voices of the
agricultural economist and other disciplinary specialists are often drowned
out. 
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4. An institutional approach
 
In the policy arena, agricultural economists have some new and power-
ful tools. Institutions and organisations are vital components of policy
formulation, policy implementation and evaluation. The new institutional
economics stresses that (a) institutions matter, and (b) they are susceptible to
analysis, particularly through the use of public choice concepts and trans-
action cost economics.
The traditional approach to economic policy is to regard the outcome of
the free market in general equilibrium as ‘optimal’. When market failures,
imperfections or externalities occur, it is said to be the job of government
to intervene with policies and programs to correct matters and set the
economy back on its ‘optimal path’. But many economists have themselves
been strongly critical of government policy interventions that are based on
an economists’ theoretically ideal reference point that bears no relationship
to the actual economic environment that exists, and that is unattainable in
the real world anyway.
In his 1937 article, Nobel Laureate Coase introduced the concept of
‘transaction costs’, a notion ‘largely absent from economic theory’ (Coase
1937). Transaction costs are the costs of information acquisition, negoti-
ation and bargaining, contracting, and enforcement; all important factors
in the policy process. The key issue from an institutional point of view is
that once the analysis moves away from equilibrium states to actual
decision making, the institutional environment makes a difference to the
formulation and outcome of the political or commercial decision. Buchanan
(1975, 1979), who pioneered the work on public choice, speaks even more
directly to the policy process and ‘what economists should do’. He argues
that he has no quarrel with the maximising models of neoclassical eco-
nomics as applied to individual and ﬁrm behaviour, but they are wholly
inappropriate when applied to ‘social organizations’ where they do not
belong because there is nothing to maximise. ‘This is the bridge which eco-
nomists should never have crossed, and which has created major intel-
lectual confusion.’ The Buchanan approach has a number of insights for






. (2001) begin to address these issues in their discussion
on institutional reform (pp. 49–50) and the related section on ineffective
aid (pp. 52–53). In addition to market failure, there is also government
failure. Government failure is characterised by such factors as targets
not being reached, policies not being implemented and problems with
agents. It seems to us that at least some of the explanation of the poor
performance listed by the authors is explained by the poor execution of 
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aid policies framed with the best of intentions. This comes out in the
authors’ discussion of ineffective aid. They mention ‘poor project selection
and preparation, inappropriate technology and management imposed by
donors, lack of government commitment and ineffective management and




 Later, they talk of bad
governance. Forms of bad governance include: ‘inequitable land rights,
ineffective ﬁscal and trade policies, corruption, crony capitalism, inefﬁcient
administrative systems, and weak checks and balances in public relations’
(p. 54).
Perhaps the best recent practical summing up of a new institutional eco-
nomics perspective on development, without the author ever billing it as
such, is the book by William Easterly, 
 
The Elusive Quest for Growth
 
 (Easterly
2001). Throughout, the author argues that development economists have
forgotten, or at least misplaced, the principle rule of economics – that govern-
ment ofﬁcials, aid donors, businessmen, private individuals, everyone in short,
respond to incentives. This has led to a series of failed attempts to foster
economic growth in the developing world. The author’s own list of strategic
ﬂavours of the month since World War II include giving foreign aid, deliver-
ing machines, providing education, controlling population through family
planning (dollars for condoms), issuing massive development loans, and
ﬁnally forgiving those loans but with conditionalities attached – none of
which has been successful.
He argues that for growth to happen, governments must get rid of bad
policy and invest in purposeful knowledge creation and capital accumulation.
Governments must also subsidise research and development directly and
establish a favourable environment for entrepreneurship so that there is a con-
stant ﬂow of new technology being created and old technology being destroyed.
Governments must avoid generating poor incentives for growth, such as
high inﬂation, high black market premiums, high budget deﬁcits, strongly
negative real interest rates, restrictions on free trade, excessive red tape and
inadequate public services. Institutional reforms are needed in most devel-
oping (and many developed) countries to reduce corruption. These include the
establishment of a meritocratic civil service and rules to ensure that govern-
ment honours contracts and does not expropriate the private sector. Also
necessary are policies that eliminate the strong incentives for corruption,
many of which, such as black market premiums and strongly negative real




Poor project selection and preparation has been identiﬁed by the World Bank itself
(World Bank 1998b) as a major weakness. Its own study found that prior analytical work
has a high payoff – 1 : 9 in cost terms. 
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It is only through institutional reform, with the recognition that all indi-
viduals respond to incentives, that real development through economic
growth can occur.
Broadly speaking, the framing of development policy needs to have more
regard for the practical situation that donors and governments will ﬁnd on
the ground. This involves the role of the particular institutional mix that is
likely to be found and the policies proposed in response. Such policies
involve the appropriate set of institutions and delivery mechanisms that
together deliver the beneﬁts of a policy to a target group, or to the whole
of society. They require considerable study in their own right, particularly
in the case of delivering aid to the poor in less-developed countries. In agri-
cultural development in particular, there is a need for improvement in the
effectiveness and efﬁciency of government services involving assistance to
primary producers.
Therefore, an organisational view of the development process could and
should be adopted. Policies and programs need to be thought through and
administered from this point of view. The transactions cost approach of
Coase and his followers indicates that legislators do have a choice of imple-
mentation institutions at the policy formation stage, and the impacts on
different groups in society should be better understood. Once the imple-
mentation structure is decided, a number of government and quasi-government
agencies become involved. The problem then becomes one of conduct rather
than structure, as administrative details are unlikely to have been highly
speciﬁed in the original enactment. In this area, bureaucracies have their
own sets of rules, conventions and interests, which vary from country to
country and institution to institution, but which will be the guiding force in
determining the ongoing implementation of the enacted policy program.
According to Sandiford and Rossmiller (1996), it is this conduct stage
that will primarily determine the resulting performance of the policy in
terms of the original aims. Thus it is worthwhile to think through the policy




 or policy formation stage.
The lesson to be learned is that policies must be evaluated within the context
of the institutional environment and the right questions must be asked. The
relationship between the legislators and interest groups has an effect on
design and implementation. Bindings made on successors and on imple-
menters may be introduced to improve the acceptance of the policy. Consultation
will affect the choice of alternative policy instruments. It is in this sense
that institutions are most important in the choice and evaluation of policy
initiatives and programs in developing countries. The greatest development
failures of the 1990s in the countries undertaking structural adjustment
policies and the transition economies have been failures of institutions, 
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including economic institutions such as functioning markets. There needs
to be a clear shift in approach away from what the World Bank calls ‘one
size ﬁts all’ and we designate ‘have model, will travel’. In developed coun-
tries we sense a more pragmatic, less ideological approach to public sector
reform  and policy implementation (Schwartz 1996). Whether this new
found wisdom will be translated into practice in the development assistance
arena is an open question.
The institutional approach to policy reform is more pervasive than might
ﬁrst be thought. Particularly in Australia and New Zealand, agricultural
policy in recent years and the institutions that deliver marketing, extension
and research services have all been modiﬁed in reforms inspired by an institu-
tional approach. For example, consider the following areas in either country:
•R eform of marketing boards
•E v aluation and monitoring of policy programs
• Separation of functions including policy formation
• Private provision of services
• Integration of policy formation and policy implementation
• Contracting out
•R eliability of agents
• Privatisation of science providers
• Privatisation of extension providers
•T r aining for service staff.
On a more international basis, there are further examples from the
developing world and elsewhere (Appendix). Most of these examples were
aimed at cutting costs and introducing efﬁciencies into the delivery of agri-
cultural services resulting from smaller budgets, withdrawal of funds from
research and extension, and an increased emphasis on user charges (Johnson
2001).
Policy review processes within government and relevant agencies are
clearly important in an institutional economics approach. Greater empha-
sis should be attached to giving decision makers policy advice that has been
subject to proper analysis, and scrutiny as to its necessity, efﬁciency, and
net impact on community welfare. Program proposals need to be accom-
panied by audit procedures and monitoring devices. Compliance costs should
be identiﬁed. There should be little room for shirking or malfeasance. Yet a
review of selected government monitoring and analysis agencies indicates none
has a consistent and systematic approach to determining the effects of the
policy delivery system on the achievement of policy objectives (GTZ–FAO
2001). Lacking a constructive input from the economics profession, ground
has been yielded to ﬁscal bureaucrats and accountants. 
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In the case of foreign aid, the transactions cost model has to be directed
at relationships between donor institutions and client countries. Problems
are likely to be encountered as in the relationship between principals and agents.
In spite of the best of intentions, government departments in developing
countries may not be able to provide the type of commitment that is neces-
sary for successful jointly funded and managed development projects
(Johnson 1999). The World Bank has recognised that these principles have
application to its portfolio of lending across countries (World Bank 1998a).
The Operations Evaluation Department recognizes these requirements and




It is clear that the mix of professionals in the development process has
changed. For the moment the ‘soft’ disciplines have taken over. It remains
to be seen whether they can deliver a better result in terms of economic
development and poverty reduction.
It appears that a particular casualty has been the farm management approach
to rural development, despite all the work on agricultural systems. The
broader approach of the development anthropologists/sociologists as well
as the emphasis on multiple goals such as environment, gender, and poverty
issues have taken the emphasis off economic development in rural areas.
These approaches appear to downgrade the gains from improved agricul-
tural productivity. In addition, the remaining rump of small holders gener-
ally operate in very difﬁcult conditions which prevents the linear model of
agriculture-led development applying. Many of the gains from improved
technology have already been achieved as in the case of the green revolu-
tion varieties of wheat and rice. A further factor, emphasized in numerous
World Bank reports, is that many countries do not maintain a favourable
economic environment for their primary producers, which would allow normal
incentive systems to work.
It seems to us that there will continue to be a need to place the gains from
increased agricultural productivity in the forefront of agricultural develop-
ment for the sake of the rural people themselves. Research and extension
services must be maintained. What our analysis suggests is that improve-
ments must be sought in delivery systems and targeting of aid. It is econ-
omists who understand these processes and who can contribute the most to




The foregoing discussion and conclusions establish the basis for strengthen-
ing the role of the agricultural economist in the work of development
assistance. But agricultural economists will not be listened to unless they
are equipped to carry out their traditional tasks competently and they 
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develop effective tools to carry out new tasks for which their disciplinary
training gives them a comparative advantage – institutional analysis and
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Appendix
New institutional arrangements for the conduct of government business 
and reducing costs in agricultural services around the world
 
1.  Contracting out agricultural services:
–P r ocurement of inputs
– Distribution of inputs
–V eterinary laboratory services
–V accination campaigns
– Small farm credit schemes
– Marketing services
– Delivery, storage, transport
– Price information (Hubbard 1995)
2.  Contracting out policy advice:
– Making policy advice competitive
– Conﬁdentiality concerns
– Canadian and NZ experience (Storey 1996)
3.  Privatising veterinary services:
–V eterinary Departments in Africa
–D evelopment of the infrastructure
– Finding the agents
–R ole of para-professionals
–D evelopment of contracting procedures
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4.  Reforming agricultural service systems in Latin America:
– Closing down of agricultural extension services in Ecuador
– Encouraging NGOs to participate in irrigation services in Bolivia
– Privatising private delivery of publicly funded agricultural research





5.  Reforming science services in New Zealand:
– Separation of policy for and delivery of science services
– Competitive bidding for government science resources
–C reation of subject matter science provider companies (institutes)





6.  Outsourcing farm administration costs in Belgium
– Compliance costs, information costs, income support
– Minimizing transaction costs






7.  Extension policy in Australia
– The case for government intervention on efﬁciency grounds
–T r ansaction and administration costs arising from policy change
– Is ‘user pays’ necessarily more efﬁcient?
– Is market failure being addressed at least cost? (Marsh & Pannell
2000)